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Abstract
We estimate the effect of initial income inequality on subsequent income per capita growth
using sub-national data from Brazil over the period 1970-2000. Holding initial income per
capita and standard confounders constant, we find that places with higher initial inequality ex-
hibit higher subsequent growth. This effect is entirely driven by the lower tail of the initial
income distribution: compared to more equal places, sub-national units with a higher share of
income going to the middle quintile at the expense of the bottom quintile grow more rapidly,
while places with a higher share of income going to the top quintile at the expense of the middle
quintile get no growth boost at all. We document that both physical and human capital accumu-
lation in places with higher inequality in the lower tail of the initial income distribution outpace
capital accumulation in more equal places, while inequality in the upper tail of the distribution
is uncorrelated with subsequent physical or human capital growth. These results are consistent
with theories on credit constraints and setup costs for human and physical capital investments.
JEL Classifications: D3, O1, O4.
Keywords: Income inequality, economic growth.
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University of Tokyo, Institute of Developing Economics Tokyo, and Kyoto University. All errors are our own.
1 Introduction
A series of seminal theory papers propose different channels through which a society’s degree of ini-
tial economic inequality might impact subsequent income per capita growth. These channels include
aggregate savings and investment (Bourguignon, 1981), human and physical capital accumulation
(Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Barro, 2000; Galor
and Moav, 2004), and income redistribution and social unrest (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina
and Rodrik, 1994; Benabou, 1996; Esteban and Ray, 2000; Campante and Ferreira, 2007). Existing
cross- and within-country studies on the relationship between inequality and growth have produced
effect estimates ranging from negative to zero and positive as further discussed below. While re-
search design and data limitations may account for some of this variability, it is also possible that
the effect of inequality on growth is genuinely heterogeneous. Indeed some of the mechanisms above
have different implications for the effect of income inequality on growth, depending on whether the
middle class is richer at the expense of the poor or the rich are richer at the expense of the middle
class. Yet empirical work has almost exclusively focused on overall inequality.
This paper investigates whether inequality originating from the lower as opposed to the upper
tail of the income distribution has different effects on subsequent income per capita growth. Greater
inequality as measured by commonly used metrics (e.g. the Gini coefficient) can result from higher
dispersion in different parts of the income distribution, as illustrated in Figure 1. In Panel A, a
theoretical redistribution of income from the bottom to the middle quintile (i.e., the transition from
the Lorenz curve displayed in the solid line to that of the dashed line) implies higher overall income
inequality as captured by the Gini coefficient. However, the exact same increase in overall inequality
can be achieved by redistributing a portion of total income from the middle to the top quintile,
as shown in Panel B. Most existing empirical work has effectively treated the variation in overall
inequality the same, irrespective of the tail it originates from, despite the fact that the theory suggests
that impacts on subsequent growth may differ. For example, in models with credit constraints and
setup costs for human (Galor and Zeira, 1993) and physical capital investments (Barro, 2000), it is
conceivable that only inequality in the lower tail matters for growth.
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Consider a stylized economy with three groups of equal size (the poor, the middle class, and
the rich) and the same income within each group. Now assume that the incomes of the poor and
the middle class are initially too low to overcome the setup costs for investing in either human or
physical capital. Put differently, both the poor and the middle class cannot borrow enough to make
the relatively large investments that would be required to make a profit. Now consider another
economy with the same income per capita but with higher inequality at the bottom, i.e. the middle
class is richer while the poor are poorer. In this second economy, the middle class might be rich
enough to overcome the setup costs and make profitable investments in human and physical capital,
thus making the second economy richer than the first economy in the long run. Finally consider a
third economy, again with identical income per capita but higher inequality at the top, i.e. the rich
are richer at the expense of the middle class. Since human and physical capital investments are as
constrained as in the more equal first economy, growth will be similarly limited.
Using sub-national data from Brazil over the 1970-2000 period we first establish that holding
initial income per capita and a host of standard confounders constant, places with higher initial
income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient exhibit higher subsequent income per capita
growth. Most of the effect materializes by 1991, i.e. there is only a level effect, not permanently
higher growth. We then propose a simple approach to distinguish between the growth effects of
inequality originating from the bottom versus the top of the initial income distribution. The key
idea is to include quintile income shares instead of the Gini coefficient in an otherwise standard
cross-sectional growth regression, allowing for hypothetical income redistributions from the two
tails towards the (omitted) middle quintile while holding other income shares and mean income
constant. We find that the positive effect of overall inequality on subsequent growth is entirely
driven by inequality in the lower tail of the income distribution: compared to more equal places,
sub-national units with a 3 percentage point (one standard deviation) higher share of 1970 income
going to the middle quintile at the expense of the bottom quintile experience about 3 percent higher
income per capita by 2000. In contrast, places with a higher share of income going to the top quintile
at the expense of the middle quintile get no growth boost at all compared to more equal places.
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The differential effects of bottom versus top inequality are remarkably consistent with our
evidence on human and physical capital accumulation. We find that places with a higher share of in-
come held by the middle quintile at the expense of the bottom quintile experience higher subsequent
growth in the real value of capital stocks held by businesses across all sectors of the economy. On
the other hand, a higher share of income held by the top quintile at the expense of the middle quintile
is not associated with increased physical capital accumulation. Moreover, human capital accumula-
tion in places with higher inequality in the lower tail of the initial income distribution also outpaces
places where the bottom quintile is richer, while inequality at the top of the distribution is uncorre-
lated with subsequent human capital growth. Other channels might also be at work. For example,
higher inequality at the bottom might increase aggregate savings, and, in partly closed economies,
aggregate investment. Higher inequality at the top on the other hand would affect aggregate sav-
ings only little if at all if the propensity to save is decreasing in income. Similarly, redistributive
policies carried out at the local level may respond differently to lower- vs. upper-tail inequality.
Unfortunately, we lack data on local savings or redistributive policies in the early 1970s.
Our paper builds on an extensive empirical literature linking overall income inequality and
subsequent income per capita growth. Existing evidence is largely inconclusive and due to data
limitations there is typically very little evidence on the mechanisms linking initial inequality to sub-
sequent growth.1 The most closely related study to ours is Voitchovsky (2005) which uses the 90/75
income percentile ratio as a proxy for inequality at the top of the income distribution, and the 50/10
income percentile ratio to proxy inequality at the bottom. For a sample of 21 developed countries,
the study shows that under some specifications, inequality at the bottom is negatively correlated
with growth, and inequality at the top has a positive correlation. The main conceptual difficulty
1Early cross-country studies had found a negative relationship between inequality and growth (Alesina and Rodrik,
1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Perotti, 1996). However, this negative correlation has proven to be non-robust to
the inclusion of additional explanatory variables, and the lack of comparability of inequality measures across countries
potentially results in attenuation and other measurement error bias (Forbes, 2000). This last issue has been overcome
by a series of studies exploiting variation in inequality across sub-national units (e.g., Partridge, 1997; Panizza, 2002;
Benjamin et al., 2011). Employing a higher quality dataset drawn from household surveys, Deininger and Squire (1998)
find a negative cross-country correlation between initial income inequality and growth, whereas Barro (2000) finds a
positive correlation between the Gini coefficient and average income growth in rich countries, but a negative correlation
in poorer countries. A second strand of studies using higher quality data as well as panel data estimations find a positive
(Partridge, 1997; Li et al., 1998; Forbes, 2000), negative (Panizza, 2002; Benjamin et al., 2011) and negative though
often insignificant (Voitchovsky, 2005; Ferreira et al., 2014) correlation between Gini and growth.
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with the Voitchovsky (2005) study is that the regression specifications typically include percentile
ratios along with the Gini coefficient in the same equation. But a higher 90/75 income percentile
ratio while keeping the Gini coefficient constant necessarily implies that inequality must be lower
in other parts of the distribution. As a result, it is not clear what the coefficient on the 90/75 income
percentile ratio is picking up. A similar issue arises in Ravallion (2012), which explores the impact
of various parameters of the initial income distribution on income per capita growth and poverty re-
duction in a large sample of developing countries. The regression specification sometimes includes
the initial poverty rate along with the Gini coefficient in the same equation. But holding initial
income per capita constant, countries with a higher poverty rate are also those with higher overall
inequality, as discussed in that study. Moreover, holding both average income and overall inequality
constant implies that countries with a higher poverty rate must have less inequality somewhere else
in the distribution, which further complicates the interpretation of the coefficients.
The main contribution of our study is its conceptually straightforward approach to analyze the
relationship between left and right tail inequality and subsequent outcomes. By replacing the Gini
coefficient with the quintile income shares as our main regressors, we exploit variation in inequality
originating from either tail while keeping initial average income and the other income shares con-
stant. As illustrated in panels A and B of Figure 1, we exploit quantitatively identical differences
in income inequality arising from opposing sides of the income distribution. This implies that the
difference in effects of bottom versus top inequality we find is not driven by treating inequality in
the two tails differently. And because our regressions hold income per capita constant, places with
a lower share of income going to the poor and a higher share going to the middle class are places
where the poor are poorer and the middle class is richer not only in relative but also in absolute
terms. This is important because the credit market imperfections cum setup cost theory is based
on absolute income levels. Another advantage of our setting is that we draw on homogeneously
collected census data from a single country. Thus, unlike existing cross-country studies, we do not
face a tradeoff between data quality and sample size, and our results are less prone to measurement
error bias. Ours is also the first study to look at the effects of bottom versus top income inequal-
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ity in a developing country context. An additional advantage of our setting is that by comparing
sub-national units within the same country and state, we can abstract from differences in institutions
at the federal and state level which might be correlated with initial inequality and income growth.
Last but not least, our study also provides the first direct evidence on human and physical capital
accumulation linking initial income distribution to subsequent economic growth.
A potential drawback compared to cross-country studies is that our results could be driven by
migration, whereby places with high initial inequality at the bottom experience higher out-migration
of the poor and thus higher income per capita among remaining residents in future periods, for
example. It turns out, however, that the effect of initial income inequality on in- or out-migration
flows is close to negligible in practice as further discussed below. We also show that our results
are unlikely to be driven by differential measurement error at the bottom versus at the top of the
initial income distribution. And as in any observational study there is the possibility that our results
are driven by some unobserved confounder, such as heterogeneity in local tastes for equality for
instance. We show, however, that our estimates are almost unchanged if we adjust them to account
for potential selection on unobservables as proposed in Oster (Forthcoming). Together with our
evidence on human and physical capital accumulation, our study thus provides reasonably well-
identified estimates of the link between income inequality and growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Brazilian setting, and section 3
describes the data and presents summary statistics. Section 4 discusses our approach to analyze
the relationship between left and right tail inequality and growth and how we deal with potential
confounding factors. Section 5 presents and discusses our main results, and section 6 presents
evidence on mechanisms. Section 7 presents the results of multiple robustness checks, and section
8 concludes with a discussion of external validity.
2 The Brazilian Setting
The starting point of our analysis is 1970, which is dictated by the availability of comparable income
data over time as further discussed below. Our units of analysis are the 3,659 Brazilian A´reas
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Mı´nimas Compara´veis (AMCs), which are roughly equivalent to Brazil’s municipalities in 1970.
On average, AMCs had about 25 thousand inhabitants at that time. And while today Brazil is a
middle-income country with a large urban population, this was by no means true in 1970 when a
large fraction of its population lived in poverty, and more than half resided in rural areas. The level
of education was also extremely low. In particular, AMCs had an average educational attainment of
individuals above 25 years old of only 1.37 years, and an iliteracy rate of 44% for people above 15.
Since 97% of individuals who worked or studied did so in their municipality of residence,
several mechanisms driving the relationship between income inequality and growth should operate
within AMCs. While there was ample room for growth driven by the accumulation of human and
physical capital, opportunities for investment were rather limited for households at the bottom of
the wealth distribution, since access to credit was not widespread. For example, in the agricultural
sector where 42% of the workforce was employed in 1970, only 12% of establishments received
credit during that year.2 Credit constraints were therefore likely binding for a large fraction of
Brazilians in our period of study. Together with setup costs, inequality at the lower or upper tail of
the income distribution might therefore lead to very different growth dynamics as argued in Galor
and Zeira (1993), for example.
An important part of the literature has devoted attention to the role of political forces in ex-
plaining the relationship between inequality and economic development (e.g., Persson and Tabellini,
1994; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Benabou, 1996, among others). In particular, these studies posit
that more unequal societies face higher pressure for redistribution, which in turn generates distor-
tions and hampers growth. Although Brazil was under a military dictatorship from 1964 until 1985,
local elections were still held in most municipalities. Furthermore, while only 2.6% of total revenues
were raised by municipal taxes, around 12%-17% of total public spending was done by municipal
governments (Hagopian, 1996). So even though within-AMC inequality in the 1970s could not
impact local taxation in a relevant way, it might still affect the composition of spending and thus
economic development. While we do not mean to play down the role of redistributive policies in
2These figures are based on our own calculations using the 1970 population and agricultural censuses. Information
on access to credit for households or firms in other sectors is not available for this period.
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mediating the effect of local inequality on subsequent growth, it is not clear from a theoretical per-
spective how inequality generated at the bottom as opposed to the top of the income distribution
would interact with spending decisions at the AMC level. Furthermore, lack of information on
spending at the local level for this period does not allow us to explore this issue further.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis relies on the 25% sample of the 1970 and 1980 Brazilian censuses obtained from the
Brazilian Statistical Agency (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estadı´stica, IBGE), and on AMC-
level statistics published by IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econoˆmica Aplicada).3 The starting point of
our analysis is 1970 since this is when the first round of the Brazilian census with precise information
on individual incomes was conducted.4 Our units of analysis are the 3,659 Brazilian AMCs, which
are themselves based on all existing municipalities from 1970 to 2000. Since many municipalities
split or merged with others after 1970, doing our analysis at the AMC-level allows us to keep the
borders constant and follow the same geographical units over time.5
When working with the 1970 25% census sample we first match the 3,974 municipalities
appearing in this census to their corresponding AMCs.6 This census investigated the monthly income
for all individuals 10 years and older and asked for: (i) the income of the last month for those
who earn a fixed income (e.g., salaries, pensions, etc.); (ii) the average monthly income in the last
twelve months for those who receive variable income (e.g. professionals’ fees, sale and brokerage
commissions, payments for services rendered, etc.); and (iii) the monthly average of other regular
sources of income such as routine donations, rents, dividends, etc. We construct the per capita
family income distribution for each AMC in 1970 by dividing the sum of the individual incomes
of all family members living in the same household by the number of family members.7 This way,
3Available at http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/.
4In the previous census round in 1960, income was reported in only eight categories.
5Brazil had 3,974 municipalities in 1970, and 5,507 by 2000.
6We match municipality and AMC codes using the Data Zoom program developed by the Department of Economics
at PUC-Rio, available at http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/datazoom/english/.
7Only 1.68% of individuals who report having a source of income do not report their earnings.
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all family members living under the same roof have the same per capita income. We exclude from
our analysis those individuals living in collective dwellings (e.g. hotels, hospitals, nursing homes),
which amount to 1.89% of our sample. We also exclude individuals living in a private dwelling who
are unrelated to the family head (tenants and domestic servants) and who account for 2.21% of all
individuals. We then construct three main indicators from each AMC’s per capita family income
distribution, using the appropriate expansion weights provided by IBGE. First, we calculate the
average per capita family income in 1970, which we express in R$ of 2000. Second, we construct
the 1970 AMC Gini coefficient,8 and third the share of total AMC income held by each of the
quintiles. We also calculate an approximation to the Gini coefficient using these quintiles shares.9
Unlike subsequent censuses, incomes above Cr$ 9,998 are top-coded at this value,10 affecting 0.04%
of employed individuals. As a robustness check, we adjust top-coded incomes, multiplying them by
a factor of 2.15 so that individual incomes in the top 20% follow a Pareto distribution.11 We also use
the 1970 census to compute the share of occupied individuals working in each of the 16 economic
sectors detailed in the census, which we use as controls in the robustness checks we perform in
Section 7.1.12
We apply the same procedure to the microdata from the 1980 25% long-form sample in order
to obtain the per capita family income distribution of each AMC, and in turn compute a series of per
capita income percentiles and poverty rates for each AMC. For computing poverty rates, we use three
different poverty lines: (i) half of the Brazilian minimum wage in September 1991; (ii) US$ 2 a day
at 2005 PPP, which is the median poverty line amongst developing countries based on a compilation
of national poverty lines in Ravallion et al. (2009); and (iii) US$ 1.25 a day at 2005 PPP, the mean
poverty line for the poorest 15 countries. The first of these was obtained from IPEA, whereas the
8We use the ineqdec0 code written by Stephen Jenkins for this calculation.
9Define Qn as the share of total AMC income held by quintile n. Then Gini ≈ 0.8× [Q5+0.5Q4−0.5Q2−Q1].
10All figures in the 1970 and 1980 census are reported in Cruzeiros (Cr$), Brazil’s currency at the time. We converted
all figures to Brazilian Reais (R$) of 2000 using the guidelines employed by the 1998 “Atlas de Desenvolvimento
Humano no Brasil.”
11This methodology is commonly used by researchers working with CPS data in the US. Examples include Katz and
Murphy (1992), Autor et al. (2008), and Autor and Dorn (2013).
12These sectors are agriculture and forestry; gathering of wild growing products; hunting and fishing; mining and
quarrying; manufacturing; construction; public utilities; wholesale and retail trade; services; transporting and communi-
cations; education, health and social activities; public administration, legislation and justice; national defense and public
safety; real estate, financial and insurance activities; liberal professions; and other activities.
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others were taken from Ravallion (2012). We also rely on the 1980 census 25% sample to study
the migration patterns across AMCs between the 1970 and 1980 censuses. More specifically, we
compute immigration and emigration rates for each AMC between 1970 and 1980. Since the 1980
census asks individuals how long they have been living in their current municipality, we count all
individuals in a particular AMC who report that they were not living in their current municipality
in 1970 as immigrants. Individuals who are younger than 10 years old in 1980 and belong to a
family in which the head is an immigrant are considered immigrants as well. We calculate an
AMC’s immigration rate as the ratio between the number of immigrants in 1980 and the AMC’s
total population in 1970. Furthermore, the census also asks people who have been living in their
current municipality for less than 10 years to specify the municipality in which they were previously
residing. Thus, for each AMC, we can calculate the number of people who were living there in 1970
and left. We use this to calculate the emigration rate, which is simply the number of emigrants of an
AMC divided by the 1970 population. A caveat for this measure is that the municipality of origin
is missing for approximately 19% of all immigrants. Since we cannot trace these people to their
municipality of origin, our emigration rate does not include these observations in the numerator.
We also calculate AMCs’ fertility and mortality rates, to uncover the population dynamics in this
period. The fertility rate is the ratio between the number of AMC natives who are less than 10 years
old in 1980 and the population in 1970. The mortality rate is therefore the ratio between the change
in population between 1970 and 1980 not accounted for by fertility and migration, divided by 1970
population.13
From IPEA we obtain the following 1970 AMC-level control variables, which we use in all our
regressions: average years of schooling of individuals aged 25 and above, literacy rates for people 15
years and older, total population, the percentage of people living in urban areas, and life expectancy.
We also obtain a set of time invariant AMC-level controls such as latitude, longitude, distance to
the state and federal capitals, and an indicator for whether the AMC is located on the coast. For
outcomes we got the mean per capita family income at the AMC-level for 1980, 1991 and 2000,
which was itself based on the corresponding population censuses. We calculate our main outcome
13This also includes individuals who emigrated from an AMC but do not report their municipality of origin.
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variable, the growth in AMC mean family income per capita, as the log difference in real mean per
capita family income between 2000 and 1970. We also obtained several measures of educational
attainment in 1980 at the AMC-level, which we also use as outcomes, and which are based on the
educational level of individuals 25 years and older. Specifically we use average years of education,
and the share of individuals with less than 4, between 4 and 8, and with 8 or more years of education
for each AMC.
Other IPEA data include the value of capital stocks held by businesses in each AMC in 1970
and 1980 in the agricultural, commercial, manufacturing and service sectors, all based on the respec-
tive economic censuses.14 Up until 1980, Brazil’s statistical agency carried out periodic economic
censuses covering all firms in each of these sectors. As explained in detail by the academics in charge
of performing these calculations at IPEA (Reis et al., 2005), when calculating the value of capital
stocks for agricultural establishments they include farmland, buildings, long-term crops,15 vehicles,
machinery, agricultural instruments, and livestock. They deduct the value of residential buildings
within farms, and only consider livestock used for traction or reproduction. Firms in the agricultural
sector include all establishments dedicated to farming, cattle, poultry or rabbits, beekeping, raising
silk worms, horticulture, floriculture, forestry, and extraction of vegetable products. When calculat-
ing the value of capital stocks for manufacturing, commercial and service industry establishments,
they take into account the value of firms’ capital employed in buildings, land, machinery and equip-
ment as reported in the corresponding economic censuses. The firms covered by the commercial
census are all the establishments dedicated to the purchase, sale, exchange or distribution of mer-
chandise through retail.16 Activities considered in the manufacturing census include the processing
and packaging of food products, metallurgical activities, production of pharmaceutical products,
clothes items, etc. Finally, firms in the service sector include all establishment whose activity in-
14A detailed account on how the value of capital stocks at the AMC-level was backed out from the corresponding
economic censuses by IPEA can be found in Reis et al. (2005).
15Long-term crops are those that do not need to be replanted after each harvest, such as coffee, oranges, bananas, etc.
16For example, the sales activities of a firm that produces machinery is accounted for in the commercial census only
if the firm sells its products through its own retail establishments, but not if it does so through a wholesaler. Further
explanations can be found in the reports by IBGE on the commercial censuses. For example, at http://biblioteca.ibge.
gov.br/visualizacao/periodicos/63/cc 1980 v4 n15 ba.pdf.
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volves providing services to people, such as hotels, repair shops, restaurants, and so on.17 After
calculating the value of each establishment’s capital stocks, IPEA aggregates these figures at the
municipality level, separately for each sector. In performing this calculation, they consider an es-
tablishment as belonging to a municipality if it is located there. As with all of our income figures,
capital stocks are expressed in real terms (in 2000 R$). We compute the growth in the value of AMC
capital stocks between 1970 and 1980 as the log difference in the real value of capital stocks in all
sectors of the economy.
We summarize the main variables for our analysis in Table 1. In 1970 Brazil was an extremely
poor country. The average AMC monthly mean per capita family income in 1970 was 56 R$ (in
R$ of 2000), which is approximately 38 US dollars as of March 2016. Inequality rates were high
with an average Gini coefficient of 0.47 and standard deviation 0.07. Inequality also displayed a
considerable degree of spatial variation across AMCs, as shown in Figure 2. During the 1970-2000
period income per capita more than doubled on average across AMCs. Most of these gains occurred
in the first decade and were accompanied by large increases in physical capital stocks across sectors.
4 Estimation Approach
In order to estimate the effect of initial overall income inequality on subsequent economic growth,
we run the following OLS regression:
ln(ya,s,t)− ln(ya,s,1970) = β0 + β1ln(ya,s,1970) + β2Ginia,s,1970 +Xa,s,1970δ + γs + Ua,s,t (1)
where ya,s,t is the mean per capita family income in AMC a in state s and year t. We estimate
this regression with growth in AMC mean per capita family income in 1970-2000 as our outcome
variable (i.e., when t is 2000). In order to assess the effect of initial inequality on future levels
of income per capita directly, we also use the same specification but replace income growth with
17Further details can be found in IBGE’s reports on the results of the service industry census. See http://biblioteca.
ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/monografias/GEBIS%20-%20RJ/censodosservicos/1980 v05 n03 AC.pdf.
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the (natural) logarithm of average per capita family income in 1980, 1991 and 2000, ln(ya,s,t), as
the outcome variable. Ginia,s,1970 is the Gini coefficient in AMC a in state s in 1970, Xa,s,1970 is a
vector of 1970 AMC-level controls, γs are state fixed effects and Ua,s,t is the influence of unobserved
factors on outcomes in year t.18
Our coefficient of interest in these regressions is β2, the effect of initial inequality on the
long-run level or growth rate of income per capita. There are many potential confounders at the
AMC-level in 1970 that could correlate with both initial income inequality and subsequent economic
growth, and the direction of the bias in βˆ2 is unclear. For instance, AMCs with greater income
inequality in 1970 might also be places where a higher percentage of the population has low levels
of education, and low education is likely bad for economic growth, biasing βˆ2 downwards. AMCs
with high inequality in 1970 might also be more rural, and growth patterns of rural areas might be
different from those of more urbanized AMCs for reasons unrelated to the society’s initial income
inequality. We address potential omitted variable bias by including standard growth determinants
in all our regressions as well as state fixed effects.19 In particular, Xa,s,1970 includes a set of AMC
characteristics in 1970 (average years of schooling, literacy rate, population, % of urban population,
and life expectancy), as well as other time invariant features of each AMC (latitude, longitude,
distance from the federal and state capitals, and an indicator for whether the AMC is located on the
coast). The key assumption for causal interpretation of βˆ2 is that unobserved determinants of future
income per capita are mean-independent of inequality, conditional on initial income per capita and
our controls. While this assumption is not directly testable, we think it is a reasonable assumption,
given our supporting evidence on mechanisms and the fact that our controls absorb a large part of
the variation in outcomes as shown below.
In order to distinguish between effects of inequality originating from either tail of the income
distribution, we take advantage of the fact that the Gini coefficient can be approximated with a
18Controlling for AMC fixed effects would require us to find valid instruments to deal with the presence of the lagged
outcome. We prefer the simplicity and transparency of standard regression control. Moreover, as pointed out by Easterly
(2007) for example, it is not clear whether using relatively high-frequency data is appropriate for the question we wish
to study since income inequality tends to be fairly stable over time and its impact on subsequent growth is believed
to unfold over decades, if not generations. Our estimates are consistent with this notion: although the effect of initial
income inequality on growth is strongest in the first decade, it takes around 20 years for the full effect to materialize.
19Excluding Distrito Federal which is also a municipality in itself, Brazil has 26 states in total.
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formula based on the shares of income held by each of the quintiles. That is:
Ginia,s,1970 ≈ 0.8× [Q5a,s,1970 + 0.5Q4a,s,1970 − 0.5Q2a,s,1970 −Q1a,s,1970] (2)
where Qna,s,1970 is the 1970 share of total income of AMC a in state s held by quintile n. As can be
seen in the first column of Table 2, controlling for state fixed effects and our vector of 1970 AMC
covariates, the Gini coefficient and its approximation based on quintile shares in 1970 vary almost
one-to-one, with an R2 of almost one. In light of this, decomposing differences in the 1970 AMC
Gini coefficients into differences in quintile income shares as in (2) allows us to differentially focus
on the growth effects of inequality in the left and right tails of the income distribution. Throughout
our Gini decomposition exercise, the omitted quintile is the middle one. Thus, a decrease in the
income held by the first quintile implies an increase in the income held by the middle one, and a
higher overall income inequality, as illustrated in Panel A of Figure 1. Throughout the paper we
refer to this as inequality in the left or bottom tail. The exact same increase in overall inequality
occurs when a higher percentage of overall income is held by the top quintile at the expense of the
middle one. This is what we call higher inequality in the right or upper tail, as shown in Panel B of
Figure 1. With this intuition in mind, we distinguish between the growth effects of inequality in the
left and right tails by running the following regressions:
ln(ya,s,t)− ln(ya,s,1970) = β0 + β1ln(ya,s,1970) + α1Q5a,s,1970 + α2Q4a,s,1970+
+α3Q2a,s,1970 + α4Q1a,s,1970 +Xa,s,1970δ + γs + Ua,s,t
(3)
which is the specification in (1), but replacing the Gini coefficient with four of the quintile income
shares and omitting the middle quintile share. In this regression, our coefficients of interest are α1
(the coefficient for inequality in the right tail), and α4 (the coefficient for inequality in the left tail,
when multiplied by minus 1). When exploring the correlation between inequality in the left and
right tails with subsequent growth in physical capital, we run (3) with the real value of the aggregate
capital stock held by firms instead of per capita income. We do this separately for each sector of the
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economy (agriculture, manufacturing, commerce and services), and also for the total capital stock
across sectors. In all these regressions we control for the log of the 1970 value of the capital stocks
held by firms in all sectors (as well as the log of the respective sector-specific capital stocks in 1970).
When analyzing growth in human capital, we run the above regression for a set of outcomes
capturing the 1980 levels educational attainment in an AMC, such as average years of education of
individuals above 25 years old, the percent of such individuals with less than 4 years of education
(i.e, less than a primary school degree), between 4 and 8 years (i.e., more than primary but less than
middle school), and 8 or more years of education (i.e., at least a middle school diploma). In addition
to the baseline controls included in Xa,s,1970, we also control for the 1970 proportion of individuals
25 and older with less than 4, between 4 and 8, and 8 or more years of education.
5 Results
5.1 Overall Inequality and Income per Capita Growth
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that there is positive correlation between the Gini coefficient in 1970
and growth in the period spanning 1970-2000. AMCs with a Gini that was one standard deviation
(0.07 Gini points) higher in 1970 grew about 3% more between 1970-2000. The results are very
similar when using the Gini approximation based on quintile shares, as can be seen in column 2,
lending credibility to the regressions based on equation (3) below. Moving to the regressions with
the log of income per capita in 1980, 1991 and 2000 as outcomes, it is clear from columns 3 to 5
that the results are much stronger in the first decade. Income per capita increased by about 2% by
1980 and by about 3% by 1991 in places where the Gini coefficient was 7 percentage points higher,
with only negligible additional growth by the year 2000. Taking these results together, we conclude
that AMCs with higher inequality in 1970 end up with higher average income in 2000, but do not
experience permanently higher growth.
In line with the results from cross-country growth regressions, the coefficient for the income
lag is negative and statistically significant in the first two columns, meaning that AMCs that start
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out with a higher income level grow at a slower rate. Even though our study explores within-
country (across sub-national unit) variation, Brazilian AMCs also experience income convergence
as predicted by growth theories, which speaks to the external validity of our study and suggests
that there are at least some common mechanisms linking inequality and growth both within and
across countries. We also note that our regressions account for most of the variation in subsequent
income per capita levels, (R2 of 0.877 in column 5 of Table 3), leaving little room for unobserved
confounders to dramatically alter our estimate of interest.
5.2 Quintile Income Shares and Income per Capita Growth
Having established a positive correlation between inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient
in 1970 and subsequent economic growth, we now explore whether this effect is different when
inequality originates from the lower as opposed to the upper tail of the income distribution. As
explained in Section 4, the third quintile is omitted in our regressions with quintile shares. Thus, a
decrease in the income held by the first quintile is matched by an equivalent increase in the income
share of the middle quintile, implying higher inequality in the left tail. Therefore, multiplying the
coefficient associated with the share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 by -1 gives us the the effect
of an increase in left-tail inequality on growth of AMC income per capita. On the other hand, an
increase in the share of income held by the top quintile implies a decrease in the share of income
held by the middle quintile, and an increase in inequality in the right tail. Therefore, the coefficient
on the share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 directly gives the partial effect of an increase in
inequality in the right tail on growth of AMC income per capita.
As shown in the first column of Table 4, AMCs with higher inequality in the right tail (i.e., a
higher share of income held by Q5 at the expense of Q3) did not grow more in 1970-2000. On the
other hand, the negative coefficient for the share of income held by Q1 means that AMCs with higher
inequality in the left tail of the distribution did experience higher growth. In particular, AMCs with
a 1970 Q3 income share higher by one standard deviation (3 percentage points) at the expense of Q1
grew about 3% more over the period 1970-2000. Income per capita increased by about 4% by 1980
15
with little additional growth by 1991 and a slight and statistically insignificant drop by 2000. As
with overall inequality, higher left-tail inequality does not lead to a permanent increase in income
per capita growth. The last row of Table 4 shows that the differential impact between left- and right-
tail inequality is not only economically but also statistically significant in most specifications. We
therefore conclude that the overall effect of inequality picked up by the Gini coefficient is entirely
driven by the lower tail of the initial income distribution: compared to more equal places, AMCs
with a higher share of income going to the middle quintile at the expense of the bottom quintile grow
more rapidly, while places with a higher share of income going to the top quintile at the expense of
the middle quintile get no growth boost at all.
5.3 Quintile Income Shares and Subsequent Income Distribution
In this subsection, we analyze whether the higher growth in per capita income experienced by AMCs
with greater initial inequality in the left tail had any distributional impacts. Since this higher growth
already materializes by 1980, we focus on this period. As displayed in Table 5 and Figure 3, more
inequality in the left tail in 1970 is correlated with a positive shift in the top half of the AMC income
distribution. More specifically, in AMCs in which the share of income held by Q3 (Q1) was 3
percentage points higher (lower) in 1970, the per capita income percentiles in the top half of the
distribution were between 4% and 6% higher in 1980.
Consistent with these results, Table 6 shows that higher initial inequality in the left tail is
associated with significantly lower poverty rates, but only for broad definitions of poverty. Under
our two broadest definitions, for which the average poverty rates were 60% and 45%, AMCs in
which the share of income held by Q3 in 1970 was 3 percentage points higher (and the share of
Q1 was lower) had a poverty rate of about 1 percentage point lower in 1980. Higher initial left-tail
inequality does not correlate with lower poverty rates in 1980 for our strict definition of poverty.
16
6 Evidence on Mechanisms
6.1 Quintile Income Shares and Physical Capital Growth
Given the positive correlation between 1970 inequality in the left tail and subsequent growth in
mean per capita family income, we should observe a similar correlation with growth in physical
and human capital if credit constraints and setup costs are important. In Table 7, we regress real
growth in the value of the capital stocks held by firms from different sectors in the period spanning
1970-1980 against the quintile income shares, the 1970 value of both total and sector-specific capital
stocks in 1970 and our other controls. Consistent with the zero growth effect of right-tail inequality
discussed above, we find small and statistically insignificant effects of inequality in the right tail on
growth in firms’ capital stocks for three out of four sectors as well as overall. On the other hand,
we find a positive and sizable correlation between inequality in the left tail in 1970 and growth in
the value of capital stocks from 1970 to 1980 for all four sectors as well as overall. Total capital
stocks grew about 10% more in real terms in AMCs in which the 1970 income share of Q3 was one
standard deviation higher at the expense of the bottom quintile. The effect of left-tail inequality on
physical capital accumulation arises across sectors, ranging from about 9% in agriculture, to about
16% in the commercial sector, about 27% in manufacturing and about 15% in services.
6.2 Quintile Income Shares and Human Capital Growth
Turning to investments in education, Table 8 shows a similar pattern. The first column documents
that there is no correlation between initial inequality in the right tail and growth in average ed-
ucational attainment over the 1970-1980 period. On the other hand, average years of schooling
experienced higher growth in 1970-1980 in AMCs that started out with higher inequality in the left
tail. Though significant statistically, this effect is relatively small: AMCs in which the income held
by the middle quintile in 1970 was 3 percentage points higher (at the expense of the bottom quintile)
saw an increase of 0.03 years in average educational attainment of individuals above 25 years of age.
Turning to the regressions in columns 2 to 4, it is clear that this increase in educational attainment
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was driven by a smaller proportion of the population with less than 4 years of education (i.e., less
than a primary school degree), and a higher proportion with educational attainment of between 4
and 8 years. Higher inequality at the top also increased the proportion of the population with more
than 8 years of schooling, but the impact is negligibly small.
6.3 Quintile Income Shares and Migration
A plausible concern is that our results are driven by differential migration patterns. As shown in
column 1 of Table 9, AMCs with a lower Q1 income share and higher share of income held by
the third quintile exhibit higher population growth between 1970 and 1980, but the impact is very
small. In particular, the population in AMCs with a 1970 Q3 income share higher by one standard
deviation (3 percentage points) at the expense of Q1 grew about 4.5% more over the period 1970-
1980. One concern is that AMCs with high initial left-tail inequality could be attracting workers
with higher education and higher potential earnings, leading to a selection-driven increase in average
income. However, as shown in column 2 of Table 9, this increase in population was not driven by
immigration, since AMCs with higher inequality in the left tail in 1970 did not experience higher
immigration between 1970 and 1980, the decade of highest growth. Alternatively, places with high
initial inequality in the left tail might experience higher out-migration of the poor and thus higher
income per capita among remaining residents in future periods. As shown in column 3 of Table 9, we
actually find the opposite: AMCs with higher inequality in the left tail in 1970 experienced lower
emigration rates.20 However, this effect is negligible in practice. A 3 percentage point increase
in the share of total income held by the middle quintile (at the expense of the bottom quintile) is
associated with an emigration rate 0.70 percentage points lower over the 1970-1980 decade relative
to an average emigration rate of about 19%. It turns out that the higher growth in population between
1970 and 1980 experienced by AMCs that started out with higher inequality in the left tail is mostly
driven by a lower mortality rate, as shown in column 5 of Table 9.21
20These results should be taken with care, since the municipality of origin is missing for approximately 19% of all
immigrants.
21What we refer to as mortality rate is actually a residual category, namely the ratio between the change in population
between 1970 and 1980 not accounted for by fertility and migration and the 1970 population. This includes not only
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7 Robustness Checks
7.1 Controlling for 1970 Sectoral Labor Force Shares
While our main specification controls for the share of an AMC’s 1970 population living in rural
areas, as a robustness check we also account for differences in the initial structure of the economy
in a more flexible manner. As detailed in Section 3, we control for the share of occupied individuals
working in each of the 16 economic sectors defined by the 1970 census. As shown in Tables A.1
and A.2, the association between inequality in 1970 and subsequent economic growth is robust to
the inclusion of these controls. Our evidence on channels featured in Tables A.3 and A.4 is also
consistent with our results on inequality, although slightly weaker when it comes to physical capital
accumulation.
7.2 Imputing Top-Coded Incomes
Unlike subsequent censuses, incomes in the 1970 census are top-coded, a practice which affects
0.04% of employed individuals. In order to check whether our results are driven by differential
measurement error at the bottom versus at the top of the initial income distribution, we impute
top-coded incomes and construct new quintile shares. Following the methodology used by Katz
and Murphy (1992), Autor et al. (2008), and Autor and Dorn (2013), among others, we multiply
top-coded incomes by a factor of 2.15, so that individual incomes in the top 20% follow a Pareto
distribution. As can be seen in Table A.5, our main results are robust to these imputations.
7.3 Alternative Definition of the 1970 Census Universe
As explained in Section 3, the 1970 AMC income statistics used in our main specification exclude
individuals living in collective dwellings and individuals who live in a private dwelling but are
unrelated to the family head (i.e., tenants and domestic servants), which in total account for 4.10%
people who passed away in 1970-1980, but also individuals who emigrated from the AMC but did not report their
municipality of origin.
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of individuals in the 1970 census. While the correlation between initial inequality in the left tail and
subsequent growth in income per capita is robust to the inclusion of these individuals, as shown in
Table A.6, inequality at the top is positively correlated with growth in income per capita in some
specifications. However, the coefficients for inequality in the top are smaller and not robust across
specifications.
7.4 Adjusting for Selection on Unobservables
As discussed in Section 4, there could be many confounders at the AMC-level in 1970 correlating
with both initial income inequality and subsequent economic growth. Although we address potential
omitted variable bias by including standard growth determinants in all our regressions as well as state
fixed effects, we cannot fully rule out the existence of unobservable determinants of AMC growth
which correlate with initial income inequality even conditional on these controls.
In this subsection, we follow the approach of Oster (Forthcoming), itself an extension of the
methodology developed by Altonji et al. (2005), to evaluate the robustness of our estimates to po-
tential omitted variable bias. Under the two assumptions that observable and unobservable variables
are equally related to the regressor of interest and that the bias from unobservables is not so large
that it biases the direction of the covariance between the observables and the regressor of interest,
Oster (Forthcoming) develops an estimator that accounts for selection on unobservables. We also
assume, as proposed in that paper, that the hypothetical maximum R2 from a regression of the de-
pendent variable against all observable and unobservable controls is the minimum value between 1
and 1.3 times the R2 of the regression with observable controls. Since the quintile income shares
only capture inequality in the left and right tails if they are conditioned on the other quintile shares
and initial income, we include all of these in the “uncontrolled” regression.
Our estimates are almost unchanged if we adjust them to account for potential selection on
unobservables. The bias-adjusted estimate for the Gini coefficient in the regression using growth
in 1970-2000 as the outcome variable is equal to 0.402, down from 0.447 in the specification that
controls for all our observables (column 1 in Table 3). Intuitively, the change is so small because the
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increase in R2 is massive (from 0.013 in the uncontrolled regression to 0.673 controlling for observ-
ables) compared to the change in coefficient estimates (from an uncontrolled 0.541 to a regression-
controlled 0.447). If we apply the same procedure to the first quintile income share (again with
growth in 1970-2000 as the outcome variable), the adjusted estimate is -0.902, which is practically
unchanged from the controlled estimate of -1.065 in column 1 of Table 4. In the case of Q5, which
was small and statistically insignificant in our initial regression, controlling for potential omitted
variable bias results in an impact estimate of 0.169, compared to 0.243 in column 1 of Table 4.
8 Conclusion
This study investigates whether inequality originating in the lower as opposed to the upper tail of
the income distribution has different effects on subsequent income per capita growth. Using sub-
national variation in Brazil, we find that holding average income per capita and an extensive set of
controls constant, AMCs with higher inequality in the left tail of the income distribution in 1970
exhibited higher growth in income per capita over the subsequent three decades. At the same time
there is no correlation between initial inequality in the right tail of the AMC income distribution
and growth. We show that our estimates are remarkably robust when we account for selection on
unobservables. Moreover, our results are barely affected if we flexibly control for 1970 structural
differences across sectors, impute incomes that were top-coded in the 1970 census, or use alternative
definitions of the population underlying our inequality measures. Consistent with the existence of
credit constraints and setup costs for investing in physical and human capital, we show that AMCs
that started out with higher inequality in the left tail also accumulated physical and human capital at
a faster pace while right-tail inequality has no such effects.
Whether higher left-tail inequality would lead to higher growth in other contexts depends on
the level of income and setup costs. Consider once more a stylized economy in which the population
is divided into three groups of equal size (the poor, the middle class, and the rich). If the incomes
of the poor and the middle class are initially too low to overcome the setup costs for investing
in either human or physical capital, an increase in inequality at the bottom while keeping overall
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income constant (i.e., a transfer of income from the poor to the middle class) might allow the middle
class to overcome the setup costs and invest in human and physical capital. But consider instead an
economy where credit constraints only bind for the poorest group. Higher inequality in the left tail
would have no impact on growth in this situation. In an even richer economy in which all groups can
profitably invest in human and physical capital, higher inequality in the lower tail could even be bad
for growth if it results in the poor becoming credit constrained. Assessing the external validity of
the credit constraint cum setup cost mechanism thus requires direct evidence on human and physical
capital accumulation in line with whatever relationship between left- or right-tail inequality and
growth is found in a given setting.
22
References
Aghion, Philippe and Patrick Bolton, “A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development,”
Review of Economic Studies, 1997, 64 (2), 151–172.
Alesina, Alberto and Dani Rodrik, “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth,” Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 1994, pp. 465–490.
Altonji, Joseph G., Todd E. Elder, and Christopher R. Taber, “Selection on Observed and Unob-
served Variables: Assessing the Effectiveness of Catholic Schools,” Journal of Political Economy,
2005, 113 (1), 151–184.
Autor, David H. and David Dorn, “The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of
the US Labor Market,” American Economic Review, 2013, 103 (5), 1553–1597.
, Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney, “Trends in US Wage Inequality: Revising the
Revisionists,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 2008, 90 (2), 300–323.
Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Andrew F. Newman, “Occupational Choice and the Process of Develop-
ment,” Journal of Political Economy, 1993, 101 (2), 274–298.
Barro, Robert J., “Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries,” Journal of Economic Growth,
2000, 5 (1), 5–32.
Benabou, Roland, “Inequality and Growth,” in “NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1996, Volume
11,” MIT Press, 1996, pp. 11–92.
Benjamin, Dwayne, Loren Brandt, and John Giles, “Did Higher Inequality Impede Growth in
Rural China?,” Economic Journal, 2011, 121 (557), 1281–1309.
Bourguignon, Francois, “Pareto Superiority of Unegalitarian Equilibria in Stiglitz’ Model of
Wealth Distribution with Convex Saving Function,” Econometrica, 1981, pp. 1469–1475.
23
Campante, Filipe R. and Francisco H.G. Ferreira, “Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oli-
garchy,” Journal of Public Economics, 2007, 91 (5), 993–1021.
Deininger, Klaus and Lyn Squire, “New Ways of Looking at Old Issues: Inequality and Growth,”
Journal of Development Economics, 1998, 57 (2), 259–287.
Easterly, William, “Inequality Does Cause Underdevelopment: Insights from a New Instrument,”
Journal of Development Economics, 2007, 84 (2), 755–776.
Esteban, Joan and Debraj Ray, “Wealth Constraints, Lobbying and the Efficiency of Public Allo-
cation,” European Economic Review, 2000, 44 (4), 694–705.
Ferreira, Francisco H. G., Christoph Lakner, Maria Ana Lugo, and Berk O¨zler, “Inequality of
Opportunity and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Analysis,” 2014.
Forbes, Kristin J., “A Reassessment of the Relationship between Inequality and Growth,” American
Economic Review, 2000, pp. 869–887.
Galor, Oded and Joseph Zeira, “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics,” Review of Economic
Studies, 1993, 60 (1), 35–52.
and Omer Moav, “From Physical to Human Capital Accumulation: Inequality and the Process
of Development,” Review of Economic Studies, 2004, 71 (4), 1001–1026.
Hagopian, Frances, Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil, Cambridge University Press,
1996.
Katz, Lawrence F. and Kevin M. Murphy, “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963–1987: Supply and
Demand Factors,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992, 107 (1), 35–78.
Li, Hongyi, Lyn Squire, and Heng-Fu Zou, “Explaining International and Intertemporal Variations
in Income Inequality,” Economic Journal, 1998, 108 (446), 26–43.
Oster, Emily, “Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of
Business Economics and Statistics, Forthcoming.
24
Panizza, Ugo, “Income Inequality and Economic Growth: Evidence from American Data,” Journal
of Economic Growth, 2002, 7 (1), 25–41.
Partridge, Mark D., “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Comment,” American Economic Review,
1997, 87 (5), 1019–1032.
Perotti, Roberto, “Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data say,” Journal of
Economic Growth, 1996, 1 (2), 149–187.
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?,” American Economic
Review, 1994, pp. 600–621.
Ravallion, Martin, “Why Don’t We See Poverty Convergence?,” American Economic Review,
2012, 102 (1), 504–523.
, Shaohua Chen, and Prem Sangraula, “Dollar a Day Revisited,” World Bank Economic Review,
2009, p. lhp007.
Reis, Eusta´quio, Kepler Magalha˜es, Ma´rcia Pimentel, and Me´rida Medina, “Estoque de Capital
Privado nos Municı´pio Brasileiros, 1970-85,” Rio de Janeiro, IPEA, 2005.
Voitchovsky, Sarah, “Does the Profile of Income Inequality Matter for Economic Growth?,” Jour-
nal of Economic Growth, 2005, 10 (3), 273–296.
25
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Dependent Variables
Ln (real mean per capita family income)
1970-2000 growth (log difference) 1.13 0.35 -0.75 3.67
1980 mean (in 2000 R$) 4.77 0.59 2.32 6.41
1991 mean (in 2000 R$) 4.64 0.59 3.17 6.38
2000 mean (in 2000 R$) 5.01 0.57 3.62 6.86
Growth in aggregate capital stocks in 1970-1980
Agriculture 1.32 0.70 -2.99 18.72
Commerce 1.28 1.17 -13.02 10.41
Manufacturing 1.66 2.47 -12.55 20.36
Services 2.00 2.11 -12.62 16.59
Total 1.39 0.61 -1.40 7.09
1980 educational attainment (people 25 years and older)
Average years of schooling 2.07 1.06 0.10 7.20
Proportion with less than 4 years of schooling 0.74 0.16 0.15 0.99
Proportion with 4 or more and less than 8 years of schooling 0.20 0.12 0.01 0.75
Proportion with 8 or more years of schooling 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.48
Explanatory Variables - all measured in 1970
Gini coefficient 0.47 0.07 0.25 0.97
Gini approximation based on quintile income shares 0.42 0.07 0.15 0.80
Share of AMC income held by Q1 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.14
Share of AMC income held by Q2 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.30
Share of AMC income held by Q3 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.27
Share of AMC income held by Q4 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.45
Share of AMC income held by Q5 0.52 0.07 0.14 1.00
Ln (real mean per capita family income) (2000 R$) 3.89 0.54 0.57 5.70
Average years of schooling (25 years and older) 1.37 0.81 0.00 5.60
Iliteracy rate (15 years and older) 0.44 0.18 0.03 0.92
Population (in 000s) 25.45 132.47 0.83 5924.61
Proportion of residents living in urban areas 0.33 0.21 0.01 1.00
Life expectancy 51.11 4.27 38.40 64.46
Notes: The unit of observation is an A´rea Mı´nima Compara´vel (AMC) over the period 1970-2000. There are
3,659 AMCs.
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Figure 1: Gini Coefficient and Inequality at the Top and Bottom of the Income Distribution
Panel A: Higher Overall Inequality Originating from the Left Tail of the Distribution
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Panel B: Higher Overall Inequality Originating from the Right Tail of the Distribution
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Notes: The solid lines display the Lorenz curve of an AMC with average quintile shares in 1970. A´reas Mı´nimas
Compara´veis (AMCs) are roughly equivalent to Brazil’s municipalities in 1970. In Panel A, the dashed line
shows the Lorenz curve of another AMC where the share of income held by the third quintile is 1 standard
deviation (3 percentage points) higher, at the expense of the first quintile, holding the other quintile shares
constant. In Panel B, the dashed line shows the Lorenz curve of yet another AMC where the share of income
held by the fifth quintile is 1 standard deviation (3 percentage points) higher, at the expense of the middle quintile,
again holding the other quintile shares constant.
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Figure 2: Gini Coefficient Across Brazilian AMCs in 1970
Notes: Each unit is an A´rea Mı´nima Compara´vel (AMC) in 1970. Darker areas indicate greater income inequality as
measured by the Gini coefficient in 1970.
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Table 2: Income Shares and Income Inequality in 1970
Dependent variable: 1970 Gini coefficient
Gini approximation 1.099***
(0.006)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.925***
(0.015)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.350***
(0.023)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 -0.332***
(0.026)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -0.696***
(0.029)
Observations 3,659 3,659
R2 0.976 0.979
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported in paren-
theses. The unit of observation is an AMC, and the dependent variable in both columns is the 1970 Gini coefficient. The
explanatory variable of interest in column 1 is the 1970 Gini approximation based on quintile shares, calculated using
the formula in (2). The explanatory variables of interest in column 2 are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each
of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. All regressions include state fixed effects and control
for 1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling attainment, literacy rate, population, % of urban population,
life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast.
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Table 3: Income Inequality in 1970 and Subsequent Economic Growth
1970-2000 growth Ln (Income)
Ln difference 1980 1991 2000
Gini coefficient 0.447*** 0.313*** 0.415*** 0.447***
(0.060) (0.073) (0.072) (0.060)
Gini approximation 0.521***
(0.066)
Ln (1970 income) -0.771*** -0.770*** 0.386*** 0.296*** 0.229***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.021) (0.017)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.673 0.673 0.857 0.849 0.877
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The unit of observation is an AMC. The dependent variable in columns 1
and 2 is the 1970-2000 growth in the mean per capita family income, and the dependent variable
in columns 3, 4 and 5 is the mean per capita family income in 1980, 1991 and 2000 (in ln). The
1970 Gini approximation based on quintile shares is calculated using the formula in (2), and Ln (1970
income) is the mean per capita family income in 1970 (in ln). All regressions include state fixed
effects and control for average schooling attainment, literacy rate, population, % of urban population,
life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is
located on the coast.
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Table 4: Income Shares in 1970 and Subsequent Economic Growth
1970-2000 growth Ln (Income)
Ln difference 1980 1991 2000
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.243 0.183 0.092 0.243
(0.170) (0.226) (0.198) (0.170)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.216 0.126 -0.026 0.216
(0.229) (0.328) (0.255) (0.229)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 -0.349 0.359 -0.125 -0.349
(0.277) (0.336) (0.320) (0.277)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -1.065*** -1.440*** -1.591*** -1.065***
(0.380) (0.469) (0.453) (0.380)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.674 0.858 0.849 0.877
P-value (Q4+Q2=0) 0.746 0.362 0.748 0.746
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.110 0.055 0.014 0.110
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthe-
ses. The unit of observation is an AMC. The dependent variable in column 1 is the 1970-2000 growth in the mean per
capita family income, and the dependent variable in columns 3, 4 and 5 is the mean per capita family income in 1980,
1991 and 2000 (in ln). The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the
quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. All regressions include state fixed effects and control for
1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling attainment, literacy rate, population, % of urban population, life
expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast.
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Table 5: Income Shares in 1970 and 1980 Income Percentiles
Ln (Income Percentile in 1980)
10th 20th 40th 50th 60th 80th 90th 95th
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 -0.038 0.262 -0.421 -0.576 -0.790** -0.655* -0.123 0.382*
(0.028) (0.688) (0.455) (0.423) (0.382) (0.341) (0.196) (0.216)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 -0.043 0.713 0.278 0.097 -0.148 -0.407 0.050 0.339
(0.065) (0.921) (0.662) (0.626) (0.570) (0.593) (0.274) (0.305)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 -0.067 3.425*** 1.160 0.937 0.342 0.351 0.101 0.134
(0.051) (1.165) (0.827) (0.727) (0.691) (0.312) (0.295) (0.329)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -0.084 2.986** -1.429 -2.056** -2.173*** -2.316*** -1.707*** -1.325***
(0.060) (1.482) (0.965) (0.829) (0.663) (0.598) (0.425) (0.474)
Observations 3,658 3,658 3,658 3,658 3,658 3,658 3,658 3,658
R2 0.807 0.415 0.665 0.726 0.791 0.856 0.867 0.854
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The unit of observation is an AMC.
The dependent variables are the different AMC income percentiles in 1980 (in ln), based on per capita family incomes. The explanatory variables of interest are the
shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. All regressions include state fixed effects and control
for 1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling attainment, literacy rate, population, % of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance
from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast.
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Figure 3: Inequality in the Left in 1970 and 1980 Income Percentiles
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Notes: The solid line plots the 1980 income percentiles of the average AMC in terms of per capita family income.
The dashed line plots the 1980 income percentiles of an AMC with a 1 standard deviation higher (lower) share of
income held by the third (first) quintile in 1970, which was calculated using the coefficients in Table 5.
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Table 6: Income Shares in 1970 and 1980 Poverty Rates
% of people under poverty line in 1980
1/2 the Sep-91 min. wage US$ 2 a day US$ 1.25 a day
(84.73 R$ a month) (50.67 R$ a month) (26.43 R$ a month)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.158*** 0.084 0.014
(0.057) (0.061) (0.062)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.004 -0.037 -0.070
(0.073) (0.082) (0.088)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 -0.188** -0.205** -0.140
(0.090) (0.104) (0.102)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 0.417*** 0.326** 0.106
(0.127) (0.136) (0.132)
Observations 3,658 3,658 3,658
R2 0.871 0.826 0.699
Dependent Variable Mean 0.604 0.447 0.319
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The unit of
observation is an AMC. The dependent variable is the share of people in the AMC in 1980 below the poverty line in terms of their per capita
family income. The poverty line used in column 1, obtained from IPEA, is half the Brazilian minimum wage in September 1991, whereas the
poverty lines in columns 2 and 3 (US$ 2 and US$ 1.25 a day at 2005 PPP) were taken from Ravallion (2012). The explanatory variables of
interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. All regressions
include state fixed effects and control for 1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling attainment, literacy rate, population, % of
urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast.
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Table 7: Income Shares in 1970 and Real Growth in Value of Firms’ Capital Stocks between 1970 and 1980
Agriculture Commercial Manufacturing Services Total
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 -0.052 -1.168 -5.228** -0.726 -0.857
(0.596) (0.868) (2.052) (1.231) (0.538)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.060 -0.647 -5.063* -0.183 0.121
(0.751) (1.231) (2.599) (1.735) (0.730)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.262 0.159 -2.920 -0.504 -0.313
(1.014) (1.448) (3.860) (2.029) (1.012)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -2.962** -5.480*** -8.951** -4.900** -3.576***
(1.336) (1.916) (3.909) (2.438) (1.244)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.206 0.240 0.362 0.637 0.109
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.093 0.011 0.010 0.099 0.007
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The unit of observation is an AMC. The
dependent variables are the 1970-1980 growth rate in the value of the AMC’s private sector capital stocks for each productive sector, calculated by IPEA from the
1970 and 1980 economic censuses. The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile
being the omitted category. All regressions include state fixed effects and control for 1970 capital stocks in all sectors, mean per capita family income (in ln), average
schooling attainment, literacy rate, population, % of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the
AMC is located on the coast.
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Table 8: Income Shares in 1970 and Educational Attainment in 1980
Average years % of people by years of education
of education < 4 years ≥ 4 and < 8 years ≥ 8 years
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.323 -0.002 -0.024 0.026*
(0.225) (0.037) (0.035) (0.014)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.390 -0.031 0.001 0.031*
(0.311) (0.052) (0.049) (0.018)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.388 -0.055 0.062 -0.006
(0.373) (0.064) (0.059) (0.023)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -1.091** 0.177** -0.148** -0.029
(0.491) (0.079) (0.075) (0.029)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.935 0.925 0.897 0.886
Dependent Variable Mean 2.073 0.742 0.196 0.062
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The unit of observation is an AMC. All dependent variables are calculated in 1980 for individuals 25 years and older. The
explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile being
the omitted category. All regressions include state fixed effects and control for 1970 capital stocks in all sectors, mean per
capita family income (in ln), average schooling attainment, % of people according to educational attainment groups, literacy
rate, population, % of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether
the AMC is located on the coast.
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Table 9: Income Shares in 1970, Population Growth and Migration from 1970 to 1980
Population Growth Immigration Rate Emigration Rate Fertility Rate Mortality Rate
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 -0.397 -0.167 0.240*** -0.033 -0.043
(0.383) (0.317) (0.053) (0.051) (0.107)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 -0.004 0.211 0.142* -0.036 0.037
(0.427) (0.356) (0.073) (0.064) (0.135)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.787 0.616 0.032 0.103 -0.101
(0.661) (0.466) (0.100) (0.105) (0.223)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -1.494** -0.627 0.232** -0.150 0.483**
(0.643) (0.506) (0.113) (0.105) (0.210)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.210 0.194 0.524 0.596 0.276
Dependent Variable Mean 0.137 0.258 0.190 0.242 0.174
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The unit of observation is an AMC.
The dependent variable in column 1 is the AMC’s population growth rate in 1970-1980, and the dependent variable in column 2 is the immigration rate between
1970 and 1980, i.e., the ratio between the number of people living in the AMC in 1980 who were not living there in 1970 (or who belong to a family in which the
head was not living there in 1970 if aged less than 10) and the AMC’s population in 1970. The dependent variable in column 3 is the AMC’s emigration rate in
1970-1980, calculated as the ratio between the number of people who reported the AMC as their previous residence but were not living there in 1980, and the AMC’s
population in 1970. The dependent variable in column 4 is the AMC’s fertility rate in 1970-1980, computed as the ratio between the number of children less than 10
year old living in the AMC in 1980 whose parents are non-immigrants and the AMC population in 1970. The dependent variable in column 5, which we refer to as
mortality rate, is the ratio between the change in population between 1970 and 1980 not accounted for by fertility and migration and the 1970 population; this is a
residual category, including not only people who passed away in 1970-1980, but also individuals who emigrated from the AMC but did not report their municipality
of origin. The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category.
All regressions include state fixed effects and control for 1970 mean per capita family income (in ln), average schooling attainment, literacy rate, population, % of
urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
Appendix Tables
Table A.1: Income Inequality in 1970 and Subsequent Economic Growth (Controlling for Sectoral
Labor Shares)
1970-2000 growth Ln (Income)
Ln difference 1980 1991 2000
Gini coefficient 0.333*** 0.291*** 0.335*** 0.333***
(0.065) (0.080) (0.078) (0.065)
Gini approximation 0.395***
(0.071)
Ln(1970 income) -0.789*** -0.788*** 0.359*** 0.264*** 0.211***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.022) (0.017)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.682 0.682 0.860 0.852 0.880
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The unit of observation is an AMC. The dependent variable in columns 1
and 2 is the 1970-2000 growth in the mean per capita family income, and the dependent variable
in columns 3, 4 and 5 is the mean per capita family income in 1980, 1991 and 2000 (in ln). The
1970 Gini approximation based on quintile shares is calculated using the formula in (2), and Ln (1970
income) is the mean per capita family income in 1970 (in ln). All regressions include state fixed
effects and control for average schooling attainment, literacy rate, population, % of urban population,
life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, whether the AMC is located
on the coast, and the share of occupied individuals working in the 16 economic sectors defined in the
census.
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Table A.2: Income Shares in 1970 and Subsequent Economic Growth (Controlling for Sectoral
Labor Shares)
1970-2000 growth Ln (Income)
Ln difference 1980 1991 2000
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.053 0.167 -0.026 0.053
(0.175) (0.232) (0.203) (0.175)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.097 0.118 -0.106 0.097
(0.228) (0.332) (0.254) (0.228)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 -0.347 0.345 -0.132 -0.347
(0.281) (0.336) (0.324) (0.281)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -1.244*** -1.378*** -1.622*** -1.244***
(0.385) (0.483) (0.463) (0.385)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.683 0.861 0.853 0.881
P-value (Q4+Q2=0) 0.547 0.385 0.616 0.547
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.023 0.073 0.009 0.023
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported in paren-
theses. The unit of observation is an AMC. The dependent variable in column 1 is the 1970-2000 growth in the mean
per capita family income, and the dependent variable in columns 3, 4 and 5 is the mean per capita family income in
1980, 1991 and 2000 (in ln). The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of
the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. All regressions include state fixed effects and control
for 1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling attainment, literacy rate, population, % of urban population,
life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, whether the AMC is located on the coast,
and the share of occupied individuals working in the 16 economic sectors defined in the census.
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Table A.3: Income Shares in 1970 and Real Growth in Value of Firms’ Capital Stocks between 1970 and 1980 (Controlling for Sectoral
Labor Shares)
Agriculture Commercial Manufacturing Services Total
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.055 -0.952 -3.572* -0.400 -0.649
(0.562) (0.862) (1.992) (1.206) (0.532)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.243 -0.709 -4.404* -0.343 0.209
(0.734) (1.207) (2.487) (1.682) (0.728)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.234 0.521 -2.594 0.205 -0.194
(0.996) (1.400) (3.809) (1.966) (1.007)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -3.026** -4.433** -5.183 -2.742 -3.188**
(1.295) (1.917) (3.913) (2.447) (1.256)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.230 0.271 0.387 0.651 0.119
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.081 0.039 0.109 0.355 0.020
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The unit of observation is an AMC. The
dependent variables are the 1970-1980 growth rate in the value of the AMC’s private sector capital stocks for each productive sector, calculated by IPEA from the
1970 and 1980 economic censuses. The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile
being the omitted category. All regressions include state fixed effects and control for 1970 capital stocks in all sectors, mean per capita family income (in ln), average
schooling attainment, literacy rate, population, % of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, whether the AMC
is located on the coast, and the share of occupied individuals working in the 16 economic sectors defined in the census.
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Table A.4: Income Shares in 1970 and Educational Attainment in 1980 (Controlling for Sectoral Labor Shares)
Average years % of people by years of education
of education < 4 years ≥ 4 and < 8 years ≥ 8 years
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.270 0.002 -0.027 0.025*
(0.230) (0.037) (0.035) (0.013)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.336 -0.026 0.003 0.024
(0.319) (0.052) (0.048) (0.018)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.533 -0.072 0.061 0.011
(0.369) (0.063) (0.057) (0.021)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -0.947* 0.163** -0.162** -0.001
(0.492) (0.080) (0.076) (0.027)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.937 0.927 0.899 0.897
Dependent Variable Mean 2.073 0.742 0.196 0.062
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The unit of observation is an AMC. All dependent variables are calculated in 1980 for individuals 25 years and older. The
explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile
being the omitted category. All regressions include state fixed effects and control for 1970 capital stocks in all sectors, mean
per capita family income (in ln), average schooling attainment, % of people according to educational attainment groups,
literacy rate, population, % of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital,
whether the AMC is located on the coast, and the share of occupied individuals working in the 16 economic sectors defined
in the census.
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Table A.5: Income Shares in 1970 and Subsequent Economic Growth (Imputing Top-Coded In-
comes)
1970-2000 growth Ln (Income)
Ln difference 1980 1991 2000
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.191 0.123 0.033 0.191
(0.170) (0.227) (0.198) (0.170)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.221 0.127 -0.021 0.221
(0.229) (0.330) (0.256) (0.229)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 -0.377 0.324 -0.148 -0.377
(0.278) (0.337) (0.321) (0.278)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -1.117*** -1.494*** -1.651*** -1.117***
(0.382) (0.471) (0.454) (0.382)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.677 0.858 0.849 0.877
P-value (Q4+Q2=0) 0.705 0.400 0.722 0.705
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.072 0.037 0.008 0.072
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthe-
ses. The unit of observation is an AMC. The dependent variable in column 1 is the 1970-2000 growth in the mean per
capita family income, and the dependent variable in columns 3, 4 and 5 is the mean per capita family income in 1980,
1991 and 2000 (in ln). The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the
quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. All regressions include state fixed effects and control for
1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling attainment, literacy rate, population, % of urban population, life
expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast.
Top-coded incomes in 1970 are multiplied by a factor of 2.15 so that individual incomes in the top 20% follow a Pareto
distribution.
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Table A.6: Income Shares in 1970 and Subsequent Economic Growth (Including Collective House-
holds and Non-Family Members )
1970-2000 growth Ln (Income)
Ln difference 1980 1991 2000
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.314** 0.438* 0.267 0.314**
(0.142) (0.246) (0.208) (0.142)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.419** 0.547 0.326 0.419**
(0.196) (0.339) (0.275) (0.196)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 -0.307 0.583 0.014 -0.307
(0.272) (0.377) (0.337) (0.272)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -0.942*** -1.119** -1.136** -0.942***
(0.356) (0.505) (0.472) (0.356)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.672 0.859 0.849 0.878
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.170 0.338 0.174 0.170
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported in paren-
theses. The unit of observation is an AMC. For arriving at the AMC per capita family income distribution in 1970 we
do not exclude individuals living in collective dwellings and those living in private dwellings which are unrelated to
the family head. The dependent variable in column 1 is the 1970-2000 growth in the mean per capita family income,
and the dependent variable in columns 3, 4 and 5 is the mean per capita family income in 1980, 1991 and 2000 (in ln).
The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third
quintile being the omitted category. All regressions include state fixed effects and control for 1970 mean per capita
family income, average schooling attainment, literacy rate, population, % of urban population, life expectancy, latitude,
longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast.
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